The International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP)1) and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)2) has issued their new recommendations on nuclear emergency preparedness and response. The paper is trying to apply the recommendations to practices of emergency preparedness and response.
I EXPOSURE PATHWAYS AND PROTECTIVE MEASURES
Once radioactive materials are released to the environment during an accident, members of the public may be exposed mainly through the following pathways:
a. Direct external exposure to the radioactive plume; b. External exposure to the deposited radioactivity on the ground, buildings, cloths and skin; a. All possible efforts should be made to prevent serious deterministic health effects; b. The intervention should be justified, in the sense that introduction of the protective measure should achieve more good than harm; c. The levels at which the intervention is introduced and at which it is later withdrawn should be optimized, so that the protective measure will produce a maximum net benefit. The national competent authority shall set up by law or regulations the generic ranges of intervention levels (ILs) for each protective measure according to the principles, and the relevant local authorities and nuclear power plants shall set up site-specific intervention levels and derived intervention levels (DILs) in their emergency plans in compliance with the law and regulations. However, some flexibility shall still be left to the decision-makers to allow considerations of some additional factors such as social and political factors, extreme weather condition and availability of resources at the time of accident, etc.
III INTERVENTION LEVELS
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has proposed ranges of ILs and DILs in its publications SS 72, 81 and 109.2-4) However, nation-and site-specific ILs and DILs are still desirable. For estimation of ILs and DILs, the following assumptions are made to reflect the impact of loss of life expectancy resulting from a collective dose of 1 man Sv, in accordance with ICRP publication 605):
a. Nominal probability coefficient for fatal cancer is 5.0 X 10-2 Sv-1; b. The detriment coefficient for non-fatal cancer is l.0>10-2 Sv-1; c. The detriment coefficient for induction of severe hereditary damage in all generations is 1.3 X 10-2 per man Sv; d. Average loss of healthy life associated with one case of radiation induced fatal cancer is of the order of 15 years (Reference2) suggests the order of 13 years). Then the a value, i.e. the resource that the society is willing to pay for averting unit collective dose, can be derived with the human capital approach:
The a value derived from Eq.(1) should be adjusted to ensure that it is not less than the lowest value recommended by IAEA, 3000/man Sv. The derivation of ILs follows by balancing costs against benefits of each protective measures.
1. Sheltering The benefit of sheltering includes reduction of external and internal exposures by a magnitude depending on the materials and thickness of the walls and ceiling and the tightness of the shelter. The Note: "y" in the table means "effective", "id." and "bldgs" means "individuals" and "buildings", respectively.
costs involved in sheltering, Xshe1, are essentially just those due to loss of productivity in the population. Average loss of income per person per day, GNPPD, is estimated as the follows: Xshel=GNPPD=GNP/population/365 (/manday) (2) Then the intervention level for sheltering is ILshel=Xshel/ l (Sv) (3) It is recommended that sheltering lasts for no more than one or two days, as it may not be effective afterwards. The following calculation is a demonstration.
The indoor concentration of radionuclides in the shelter, A, can be expressed as a function of outdoor concentration AO and time t, assuming that the radioactive plume reaches the shelter at t=0 and A0 remains constant over the period of 0 to t, then:
A=A0 (1-e-a1rt) (4) where lair is the air exchange rate of the shelter, h-1. It is reported10) that Aair is about 0.33 and 0.79 h-1 for some European and American houses, and Japanese houses, respectively. Table 2 lists the calculated values of A/A0. It can be seen from the table that sheltering is ineffective after shorter time for poorly tight houses and remains effective for longer time for more tight houses. Even for very tight houses (Aalr=0.1 h-1), the effectiveness of sheltering would be limited to one or two days.
Evacuation
The costs for evacuation, Xevac, can be expressed as the sum of costs of transportation, accommodation, loss of income in a day or two and the risk incurred during transportation.
Xevac=Xtr.evc+Xac.eve+GNPPD+Xrisk.tr (/person) (5) where Xtr.eve is the cost to transport a person to the emergency center and later return; Xac.evc is the cost for one person to maintain evacuated for one day, including accommodation, food and necessary medical care; GNPPD is the average loss of income in one day or two; and Xrisk.tr is the equivalent monetary value of the risk (Rtr) incurred during transportation, which is estimated as if the risk were caused by radiation exposure for proper comparison with the benefit (dose reduction) from introduction of evacuation.
Xrisk.tr=Rtrx/0.073 =13.7tRtr
(/manday) (6) here, 0.073 is the value of radiation detriment caused by effective dose 1 Sv. Then the intervention level for evacuation is ILevac=Xevac/a (Sv) (7) If the averted dose in a day is less than (Xac.evc+ GNPPD)/x, the people evacuated should return.
3. Temporary relocation Similarly, the costs for temporary relocation, Xreioc, are:
Xreloc=Xtr.rel+Xac.rel+GNPP5D+Xrisk.tr (/manonth) (8) where Xtr.rei is the cost to transport a person to the relocation center and later return; Xac.rel is the cost for one person to maintain relocated for one month, including accommodation, food and necessary medical care; GNPP5D is the loss of income for one person in first a few days, say in five days.
Then the intervention level for temporary relocation is ILreioc-Xreioc/a (Sv) (9) If the averted dose in the following month is less than Xac.rel/a, the people relocated should return.
4. Permanent resettlement The costs for permanent resettlement, Xreset, would be the sum of the cost of transportation of a person and his/her belongings, Xtr.res, the risk incurred and the cost of loss or damage of the belongings during transportation, Xrisk.res, the cost of construction (or rent) and furnishing of the new accommodation, Xac.res) and loss of income in a short period, say one month, GNPPM. No long term continuing costs are to be expected.
Xreset=Xtr.res+Xac.res+GNPPM+ Xrisk.res (s) (10) Then the intervention level for permanent resettlement is ILreset=Xreset/a (Sv) (11) 5. Iodine prophylaxis The prophylactic administration of stable iodine to a population requires some degree of preparedness prior to an accident, such as preparation of stable iodine and the way of distributing to the public. The preparation itself should be justified, i.e. to determine the area within which stable iodine is prepared for the residents and possible visitors.
The cost for administration of stable iodine, Xiodpro, is the cost of stable iodine, their storage and replacement, Xiod, and the risk of side effects, Xrisk.iod.
Xiodpro-Xiod+Xrisk.iod (s) (12) Usually, administration of stable iodine accompanies other urgent protective actions, such as sheltering, evacuation or relocation, because radioactive release from a power reactor always contains radioactive iodine as well as other radionuclides. The cost for iodine prophylaxis is small, and Xrisk.iod is negligible for most people, therefore, we propose no intervention level for iodine prophylaxis is preset, and stable iodine shall be administrated at the beginning of sheltering or evacuation. 6. A case study As for Japan, the a value and the intervention levels for sheltering, evacuation, temporary relocation and permanent resettlement can be derived with equations (1)-(3) and (5)-(I1), as follows. The economical data used here are 1990 Japanese statistics: GNP=4.25736 X 1014 Japanese Yen,6) Japanese population=1.2434 X 108 persons, and the currency exchange rate in 1990 is roughly 150 Japanese Yen= 1. Unfortunately, we do not have more updated data in hand at the moment, however, the aim of this paper is to demonstrate the approach of derivation of intervention levels, and using newer data would not significantly change the main conclusion of the paper, we believe. The probability of death in traffic accidents in Japan, Rtr, is estimated to be 2.425 X l0-1 per person per day averaged over the whole country, which is described in detail in another paper,8) the cost for the transportation risk is calculated as if the death were caused by radiation exposure for proper comparison with the benefit from introduction of the protective measure (dose averted). Accommodation costs are estimated by the authors, according to the prices in Japan in 1990.
cJPN=1 mSv/month ILreset=Xreset/ a=22010.9/24995=880.6 mSv The ranges of ILs for sheltering, evacuation, relocation and resettlement in Japan would be determined by relevant Japanese authority according to scientific estimation and considerations of political and social situations of Japan. The paper recommends the ranges as shown in Table 3 . Wider ranges are chosen, considering the uncertainties in determination of the values of the parameters, and flexibility that should be left to the decision-makers to allow them taking into account other factors such as political and economical situation, psychology of the public, Japanese housing, living habits and customs, etc. Generally speaking, relocation and resettlement in Japan would have higher ILs as construction or rent of houses in Japan is expensive. Table 3 Recommended intervention levels for some protective measures in Japan.
IV DECISION-MAKING ON PROTECTIVE MEASURES
The effectiveness of a protective measure depends on many factors such as the realistic situation of an accident, environmental conditions at the time of accident and, especially for urgent protective measures in the early phase of an accident, timing of the protective measure. Timely and appropriate decision-making may make the protective measures more effective and vice versa. According to the principles of intervention described in section II, the following decisions should be made:
a. Ascertain plant situation (especially reactor situation) and determine the emergency classification; b. Initiate emergency facilities in accordance with the emergency classification; c. Dispatch emergency response teams; d. Dispatch nuclear and radiation safety experts to the plant in emergency and the local emergency organizations; e. Predict off-site consequences in very early stage based on the plant situation rather than model prediction or environmental monitoring, and later on based on environmental monitoring results and/or model prediction when the results and inputs for model prediction are available; Find out people at most risk of severe deterministic effects or at high risk of stochastic effects, if any; f. Recommend urgent protective measures by comparison of projected doses (PD) with ILs, taking into account the extreme weather conditions at the time of accident. If the reactor core has molten or is to melt soon for certain, urgent evacuation should be recommended, as the evacuation will be most effective if it can be completed before release of radioactive materials. It is reported9) that the risk of death incorporated in evacuation is only 2 X 10-6 (even lower in Japan), 8) while 1% to 10% of core melt accidents may lead to releases of vital amount of radioactive materials to the environment. As the costs for iodine prophylaxis and simple respiratory protection are very small, therefore, sheltering and urgent evacuation can be accompanied by iodine prophylaxis and simple respiratory protection; g. Recommend protective measures in intermediate and late phases by comparison of projected doses or other readily measurable quantities with ILs or DILs, and more detailed balance of costs and benefits as the available time allows, taking into acount political, social and psychological factors, and availability of necessary resources for conducting intended protective measures at the time of accident. The projected doses or other readily measurable quantities should be determined based on environmental monitoring or model prediction; h. Continue review of residual dose after protective measures have been taken and decide whether a protective measure shall be withdrawn or continued and whether additional protective measure is justified; i. Recommend recovery actions; j. Decision on termination of the emergency; Figure 1 shows a decision-making chain which reminds the decision-makers what decisions should be made and what should be considered in making the decisions. Flexibility is still left to the decisionmakers, allowing them to consider other factors than radiation protection ones, for example, psychological problem among the public;
It is important to make information feedback. After an exercise or a real accident, experiences and lessons learnt shall be carefully collected and studied, and the emergency plans and implementing procedures should be modified accordingly, if necessary.
V ORGANIZATIONS AND THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES INVOLVED IN THE DECISION-MAKING
The organizations involved include national authorities, local authorities and the management of nuclear power plants. The authors would like to give basic thoughts for discussion on their responsibilities in countermeasure-related decision-making as the follows.
1. Responsibilities of the national authorities 1.1 Prior to emergency Establish the policy, principles and regulations for intervention; Determine, review and revise, if necessary, z value and ILs, and approve DILs of each site recommended by local authorities and nuclear power plant management; Review and approve on-site and off-site emer-gency plans of each nuclear facility; Review and inspect the emergency preparedness of local emergency organizations and nuclear power plants.
During emergency
Judge emergency classification based on the plant situation; Review and approve important decisions made by local authority and/or nuclear power plant management, such as initiation of general emergency, conduct of protective countermeasures in big areas and/or with involvement of large number of people (for example food/ water control in a large area, resettlement of large number of people) emergency assistance and termination of the emergency; Dispatch nuclear and radiation safety experts to the plant at emergency and the local bodies; Direct or guide large scale emergency response; Request international assistance, if necessary; It is our opinion that nuclear power plant management should take more responsibilities in decisionmaking, especially in the early phase of an accident, because no one else knows the accident and its progress better than the plant on-duty personnel do at that time. They can even make important decisions such as declaration of a general emergency on a very urgent basis for timely taking necessary actions, we think, then report to the national and local authorities as soon as possible.
